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DISTINCTION

ENTITLED TO AID TO FAMILIES

WITH DEPENDENT CHILDREN UNDER EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.

Shapiro v. Thompson (U.S. 1969).
Miss Vivian Thompson,' unwed and pregnant with her
second child moved from Massachusetts to Connecticut to live
with her mother. Two months later, when her mother was no
longer able to support her, she moved to her own apartment. Miss
Thompson's pregnancy made her unable to work or to enter a
work training program. She applied for assistance under the Aid
to Families with Dependent Children program' (AFDC) and was
denied assistance because she had not resided in Connecticut for
one year prior to her application. She brought her action in the
District Court for the District of Connecticut. The Federal
District Court3 found that the Connecticut statute which denied
her aid was unconstitutional. On appeal to the United States
Supreme Court, held, affirmed: the one-year residence
requirement was restrictive of Miss Thompson's right to travel
uninhibited between the states and was furthering constitutionally
impermissible state objectives. Shapiro v. Thompson, 89 S. Ct.
1322 (1969).
I.

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO TRAVEL

The state argued that the one-year waiting period was
designed to limit immigration of people who need or may need
welfare assistance.- The Supreme Court disapproved this objective
I. Shapiro v. Thompson combines three cases from the Federal District Courts of
Pennsylvania, the District of Columbia, and Connecticut and affects a total of eight
appellees. One appellee died during the interim between trial in the district court and the
final decision by the Supreme Court. The Connecticut case alone is treated in this article
for clarity. The fact situations are similar in all three cases. All but one of the appellees
applied for assistance under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program. The
other applied for Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled. Only two of the appellees
were pregnant at the time of application. One of them was in ill health besides. It does
not appear that any appellee made her interstate move for any reason other than to be
with her family. The same arguments are made in all three cases except as noted in
footnotes to this article.
2. Aid to Families with Dependent Children was established by the Social Security
Act of 1935, is found in 42 U.S.C. § 301 et. seq.. and is hereinafter referred to as AFDC
except in direct quotes from other authorities.
3. Thompson v. Shapiro, 270 F. Supp. 331 (D.C. Conn. 1967).
4. CoNN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 17-2d (1966), now § 17-2c.
5. 89 S. Ct. 1322 at 1328.

19701

RECENT CASES

as improper.' All persons have a fundamental right to travel
between the states which is not derived from any particular section
of the Constitution, but is nevertheless protected from private and
governmental interference.
The development of the right to travel started with the dicta
of Chief Justice Taney7 in the Passenger Cases of 1849 s and
continued through Edwards v. California' to United States v.
Guest.'" The issue in the Guest case was the freedom of an
individual of any race to use the roads of a state for interstate
travel without physical interference from private persons. The
fundamental right to travel freely from state to state was the
foundation of the remedy given the United States for the victim
deprived of that right against the wrongdoer."
In Shapiro there was no showing of any real interference with
6. Id. at 1328-29.
7. Chief Justice Taney said: "'For all the great purposes for which the Federal
government was formed, we are one people, with one common country. We are all citizens
of the United States; and, as members of the same community, must have the right to
pass and repass through every part of it without interruption, as freely as in our own
states."
8. 48 U.S. (7 How.)283,492 (1849).
9. 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
10. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
II. The Guest opinion is used by both the majority and the dissenting opinions in
Siapiro r-Thompson. The majority opinion says that although there is no specific mention
of the right to travel in the Constitution it is a fundamental right inhering in all persons
in the United States. Justice Stewart in his concurring opinion cites Gtest to say that the
right is protected from private and governmental interference. There are two dissenting
opinions in Shapiro. those of Justice Harlan and the Chief Justice [Justice Black with him].
On the basis of Guest. Justice Harlan concluded that: [l]he right to travel interstate is
a 'fundamental' right which . . .should be regarded as having its source in the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment."
The Chief Justice, in his dissenting opinion, denies that Guest offers controlling
principles in Shapiro. looking instead to Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500
(1964). Aptheker is a case in which the Supreme Court set aside a congressionally imposed
restriction on the right to travel. The argument was that Aptheker faced a choice which
gave no alternative, that is, a choice between his right to travel and his right to freedom
of association. This was combined with a flat prohibition on travel. Itwas the lack of
alternative which led the Court to set aside the restriction imposed by Congress.
The Shapiro Court cites with approbation United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570
(1968). The Jackson Court stated its view of governmental restrictions on personal
freedom: "if the provision had no other purpose . . . than to chill the assertion of
constitutional rights by penalizing those who choose to exercise them, then it would be
patently unconstitutional." Id. at 581. The Jackson test of such a law is: "The question
is not whether the 'chilling' effect is 'incidental' rather than intentional; the question is
whether that effect is unnecessary and therefore excessive." Id. at 582. Apparently the
Shapiro Court chose not to use it.
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the right to travel. Miss Thompson had accomplished her travel.
She had made the trip to be with her mother, not to seek welfare
benefits. If she sought only her mother's support rather than her
society, there was no reason to remain when her mother could no
longer support her.
If the one year waiting period was unacceptable to her, she
could have traveled to another state instead of another apartment.
Though the State of Connecticut extends partial assistance to new
residents, 2 there are eight states and three territories which have
no waiting period at all, including adjacent New York and Rhode
3
Island.
Additionally it was not shown that the waiting period was a
major consideration in Miss Thompson's decision to travel or
choice of destination. However, the Supreme Court said that even
if she had entered the state only to seek higher welfare payments,
the state had no right to fence her out."
II.

FENCING OUT THE INDIGENTS

The inclusion of a one-year waiting period in the Connecticut
statute created a distinction between the claimants who had been
in the state for one year and those who had not when both were
otherwise eligible for AFDC payments. Need was not taken into
consideration.
The state argued that the waiting period was necessary to
preserve the fiscal integrity of its welfare program by limiting
welfare benefits and apportioning state seriices to those who had
contributed to the state through their taxes.' 5 The "fence out the
indigents" objective ascribed to the waiting-period rather than the
waiting period itself was proscribed as being violative of the right
to travel between the states. 6
The state did not show how persons who had resided in the
state for a long period were making any greater present
contribution to the state than recent arrivals when both were
eligible for welfare benefits nor did it show a difference between
12.

CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §

13. 89 S. Ct. at 1334 n.22.
14. 89 S.Ct. at 1330.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1329.

17-2c.
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apportioning welfare benefits and apportioning other benefits and
services on the basis of past tax contributions.17 Thus a distinction
made between new and old residents needing welfare on the basis
of the waiting period was found to be invidious and could not be
upheld.
III.

CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE STATE OBJECTIVES

In addition to the limiting of immigration and the fiscal
integrity of the state welfare budget, the state argued that the
waiting period promoted (1) limiting of expenditures and
facilitated planning of the welfare budget, (2) prevention of fraud,
(3) early entry into the labor force, and (4) an objective test for
residence.18 The argument proceeded that since there was a
rational relationship between these objectives and the waiting
period, the distinction set up by that waiting period is permissible.
The Supreme Court dismissed that contention. Since the
distinction between persons eligible for benefits created by the
welfare entitlement statute touches on the individual's freedom to
travel between the states, the standard is more rigid. The
distinction must promote a compelling state interest, and none

was shown. 9
The waiting period requirements of the state were overturned
17. Welfare benefits therefore stand on equal footing with fire and police protection,
public schooling or use of parks and libraries. It would seem eminently unfair to attempt
to apportion the use of those facilities of the state. They are provided from tax monies on
a continuing basis for all regardless of need. But need and eligibility must be determined
for welfare payments. See 89 S. Ct. at 1330.
18. 89 S.Ct. at 1331. Connecticut did not join this argument.
19. 89 S. Ct. at 1331. The 'compelling governmental interest" test (as such) is
mentioned only in the introductory material and as a make-weight after all the arguments
had been disposed of under the Equal Protection Clause by comparison with the evidence.
The test was invoked because the classification of persons eligible for aid under AFDC
touched on the right of interstate travel. But it was not applied. And it was not needed.
The Court considered the arguments of purpose for the state statute to be without
weight. The state could not show any method of using the waiting period for budgetary
planning. The prevention of fraud could be accomplished by investigation, letter or phone
call. Early entry into the labor force should be applied to both new and longtime residents
and the waiting period is applied only to the new residents. Residence and waiting period
were shown to be separate and district prerequisites for AFDC payments under the state
laws.
The Court considered it well settled that residence is included in an established place
of abode within a state with the intention to remain there permanently and deemed ihat a
declaration system could be used to determine the intention of the applicant to remain in
the jurisdiction.
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as being violative of the Equal Protection Clause. "' The objectives
were perfectly acceptable to the Court under the Constitution, but
the one-year waiting period was not tailored to accomplish any of

the objectives nor did it actually do what the state claimed it did."
State welfare legislation must be designed and used as a scalpel

to separate the deserving and undeserving potential welfare
beneficiaries. The waiting period of one year sought to perform

that same operation with a blunderbuss.
IV.

WELFARE PROGRAMS PRIOR TO SHAPIRO

The Supreme Court, holding that the extension of welfare
benefits is a privilege and that no one receives such benefits as of
right22 from a state, 3 found that when a state undertakes to extend
welfare aid, it must do so in consonance with the Equal Protection
2
Clause. 1
Prior to Shapiro, the waiting period requirements of the
states were being examined in the federal courts. Interstate

compacts, had the effect of waiving the one-year waiting period for
'
25
welfare recipients moving between the signatory states.

Federal contribution was available to prevent destitution of
children and to provide living arrangements for them so long as
the states seeking federal matching for such aid already had
2
emergency assistance provisions in their statutes.
In 1968 Public Law 90-248 was enacted to spur the states
into expediting a work incentives program. 2 1 Included was a
section limiting or "freezing" federal funding of AFDC; if more
persons were entitled to aid than the federal quota, they would be
2
paid from state funds or not be paid at all. 1
20. 89 S. Ct. at 1333.
21. Id. at 1335.
22. One legal writer explains welfare entitlement in the following terms: "'The idea
of entitlement is simply that when individuals have insufficient resources to live under
conditions of health and decency, society has obligations to provide support and the
individual is entitled to that support as of right." Reich. Individual Rigti' and Social
Welfiare: The interging Legal Issues. 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1256 (1965).
23. 89 S. Ct. at 1327 n.6. See also Smith v. King. 277 F. Supp. 31 (D.C. Ala. 1967),
afl'd. 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
24. 277 F. Supp. at 40.
25. CONN. GEN. STAT. Rev. § 17-21a (1968).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 606 (e) (1968).
27. U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. News No. 7 of August 20, 1969. 1031.
28. PUB. L. No. 90-248 § 208 (b) provides:
(b) Section 403 of such Act [Social Security Act of 1935 as amended] is
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Recommendations for the repeal of the freeze section of
Public Law 90-248 had been given twice before the Shapiro
decision and at least one federal district court decision "-' and two
legislative bodies, the Senate Committee on Finance and the
House Ways and Means Committee, were awaiting the final
judgment of the Supreme Court.
V.

THE SHAPIRO DECISION

Is

ANNOUNCED

After Shapiro. the purpose of the freeze was more difficult
to attain and the cost burden on the states was higher than
Congress was willing to permit. The freeze section of Public Law
90-248 was repealed by Public Law 91-41 on July 9, 1969, less
than eighty days after the announcement of Shapiro.
The thrust of the Shapiro case is the expansion of welfare
entitlement by elimination of restrictions which may deny
claimants the equal protection of the laws. The Supreme Court
noted the existence of the interstate compacts without objection,
using them to show the irrelevance of the one-year wait to the
planning of the welfare budget.3 The need for reciprocal
agreements of this nature may have been obviated by the waiting
period. It could be anticipated that the state legislatures, viewing
the equal protection problem in drafting legislation on the subject
of residence and waiting period requirements, will sedulously
review the agreements also since they constitute exceptions to the
existing statutes. Repeal or annulment of those agreements might
be in the offing.
In Shapiro, the state contended that Congress had approved
a one-year waiting period requirement in the Social Security Act.3 '
further amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:
(d) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the average monthly
number of dependent children under the age of 18 who have been deprived of
parental suyport or care by reason of the continued absence from the home
of a parent with respect to whom payments under this section may be made
to a State for any calendar quarter after June 30, 1968, shall not exceed the
number which bears the same ratio to the total population of such state under
the age of 18 on the first day of the year in which such quarter falls as the
average monthly number of such dependent children under the age of 18 with
respect to whom payments under this section were made to such State for the
calendar quarter beginning January I, 1968, bore to the total population of
such state under the age of 18 on that date.
29. Essex County welfare Board v. Cohen. 299 F. Supp. 176 (D.C. N.J. 1969).
30. 89 S. Ct. at 1332.
31. hI. at 1333. The District of Columbia did not join in this argument.
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After denying that the Social Security Act had any restrictive
effect, the Court said in its dicta that the provision of the Social
Security Act "insofar as it permits the one-year waiting-period
requirement would be unconstitutional." 32 If the section were truly
unconstitutional, Congress would have to amend it in order to
perpetuate the federal funding of the AFDC program and the
states would have to respond with their own legislation.
For instance, the Connecticut statute on emergency
assistance 33 sets the maximum period of payment of such
assistance at "the federal maximum." If this refers to the federal
maximum period of emergency assistance, then the period is 30
days in any calendar year. If it refers to the maximum federal
waiting-period requirement for AFDC, there is no such period.
The question might seem absurd except that the Court used the
fact of temporary partial assistance given to some new residents
to dismiss the relevance of the one-year waiting period to state
34
planning of the welfare budget.
Although a one-year waiting period may not be arbitrarily
imposed, the federal requirement is that "aid to families with
dependent children shall be furnished with reasonable promptness
to all eligible individuals." 35 Reasonable promptness has not yet
been defined. However, the state must determine need and
investigate the potential welfare claimant before paying benefits
under AFDC. If emergency assistance has been commenced and
investigation has not been completed before termination of
emergency aid payments, or if a state did not have emergency
assistance as part of its AFDC administration system, other
litigation might arise with the claimant arguing the invidious
distinction made between federal and state assistance provisions in
the same program.
VI.

MODIFICATIONS AFTER SHAPIRO

Nine days after the Shapiro decision, the President sent a
message to Congress proposing Presidential authority to
consolidate federal grants-in-aid programs.36 The proposal had
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

89 S. Ct. at 1335.
CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 17-2e (1966) now 17-2d.
89 S. Ct. at 1332.
42 U.S.C. § 602 (a) (10) (Supp. IV, 1969).
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws No. 4 of May 20, 1969, 540-4 1.
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among its purposes to benefit "[s]tate and local governments,
which now have to contend with a bewildering array of rules and
jurisdictions."
On the 11th day of August, 1969, the President sent a
3
message to Congress proposing a welfare reform program. 1
Under the present welfare system, each State provides "Aid to
Families with Dependent Children," a program we propose to
replace. The Federal Government shares in the cost but each
State establishes key eligibility rules and determines how much
income support will be provided to poor families. The result
has been an uneven and unequal system. . . . The new system
would do away with the inequity of very low benefit levels in
some States, and of State-by-State variations in eligibility
tests, by establishing a Federally-financed income floor with a
national definition of basic eligibility.38
The Federal Government, under the guise of providing
adequate guidelines to the states for the administration of welfare
benefits, has already gained expanded amounts of indirect control
over the state welfare machinery. One example of such -indirect
control by additional guidelines is the right of the Federal
Government under Public Law 90-248 to define terms. In a
section making federal matching of funds available under AFDC
to children of unemployed fathers, 39 the Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare is empowered to prescribe standards
governing state definitions of unemployment. The context of the
law makes the standards applicable to AFDC, but a state could
not operate AFDC under one definition of unemployment and
unemployment compensation under another definition even
slightly different without stimulating litigation on invidious
distinction grounds.
The balance between the interests of the states as protected
by their legislatures and the efficiency of the federal grants-in-aid
in the welfare area is being resolved on the federal side to the
detriment of the states.
As grant-in-aid programs have proliferated, the problems of
delivery have grown more acute. States, cities, and other
recipients find themselves increasingly faced with a welter of
37.

167 CONG. REc. H7239-41 (daily ed. Aug. I1, 1969).

38. Id.at H7240.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 607 (Supp. IV,1969).
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overlapping programs, often involving multiple agencies and
diverse criteria. This results in confusion at the local level, in
the waste of time, energy and resources, and often in the
frustration of the intent of Congress."'
VII.

FUTURE OF WELFARE

Although neither federal nor state government has completely
accepted the theory that support is an obligation upon society and
a right for the individual, federal expansion of entitlement could
be precipitated in the near future under the President's Welfare
Reform Program. The future of the welfare system as a whole
appears to be a completely open question. Regardless of the
legislative enactments to come from the President's proposal, the
initiative is moving away from the states, leaving them with little
more than expense. Establishment of a national income floor
might remove, by application of the Equal Protection Clause, the
one drastic final option left to them-withdrawal from the jointlyfunded program. Drawn between Shapiro and the new welfare
reforms proposed, the state capitals must watch and wait.
EDWARD I. MEARS

CRIMINAL LAW-ARREST-RESISTING
PUNISHABLE AS A MISDEMEANOR

CODE SECTION

AN UNLAWFUL ARREST

UNDER CALIFORNIA

PENAL

834A. People v. Curtis (Cal. 1969).

The defendant was arrested on the street at night by a police
officer in uniform. The officer was investigating a report of a
prowler and had received a brief, general description of the suspect
as a male Negro, about six feet tall, wearing a white shirt and tan
trousers. The defendant matched this description. After telling the
defendant that he was under arrest and would have to come with
him, the officer reached for the defendant's arm. The defendant
attempted to back away and a violent struggle ensued in which
both men were injured. The defendant was subdued and taken into
custody by several other officers. In the Superior Court, the
defendant was acquitted of a charge of burglary, but was
convicted of a battery upon a peace officer, a felony.' The Court
40.
I.

See note 36, supra [emphasis supplied].

§ 243 (West Supp. 1968):
A battery is punishible by fine of not exceeding one thousand dollars

CAL. PENAL CODE

